In this study, we propose considering membership in the Ethics Officer Association (EOA) as a proxy for the firm's commitment to ethical decision making, and we analyze the influence of firm- and CEO-specific characteristics on this commitment. While we observe a positive relationship between membership and firm size, we also document a negative relationship between EOA membership and the executive's time in position and, to a more modest extent, accounting returns. Pursuing this further, we present evidence that firms with past (...) legal issues may seek EOA membership as a signal of their intention to be compliant in the future. (shrink)

We describe herein an introductory STS course, designed for large numbers of students, which uses a large number of faculty instructors. Its content and style has evolved continuously for 20 years in a major research university and been adapted for use in small two-year and four-year campuses.

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one formal logic that correctly (or best, or legitimately) codifies the logical consequence relation in natural language. This essay provides a taxonomy of different variations on the logical pluralist theme based on a five-part structure, and then identifies an unoccupied position in this taxonomy: perspectival logical pluralism. Perspectival pluralism provides an attractive position from which to formulate a philosophy of logic from a feminist perspective (and from other, identity-based perspectives, such (...) as critical race theory). An example of how such an account might be developed is sketched. The essay concludes by defusing an obvious objection to the perspectival approach: the claim that the correct logic (or logics), in virtue of the formal nature of logic, should be independent of considerations regarding the identity of the reasoner. (shrink)

Roy Sorenson offers a unique exploration of an ancient problem: vagueness. Did Buddha become a fat man in one second? Is there a tallest short giraffe? According to Sorenson's epistemicist approach, the answers are yes! Although vagueness abounds in the way the world is divided, Sorenson argues that the divisions are sharp; yet we often do not know where they are. Written in Sorenson'e usual inventive and amusing style, this book offers original insight on language and logic, the way world (...) is, and our understanding of it. (shrink)

An entertaining history of the idea of nothing - including absences, omissions, and shadows - from the Ancient Greeks through the 20th century How can nothing cause something? The absence of something might seem to indicate a null or a void, an emptiness as ineffectual as a shadow. In fact, 'nothing' is one of the most powerful ideas the human mind has ever conceived. This short and entertaining book by Roy Sorensen is a lively tour of the history and philosophy (...) of nothing, explaining how various thinkers throughout history have conceived and grappled with the mysterious power of absence -- and how these ideas about shadows, gaps, and holes have in turned played a very positive role in the development of some of humankind's most important ideas. Filled with Sorensen's characteristically entertaining mix of anecdotes, puzzles, curiosities, and philosophical speculation, the book is ordered chronologically, starting with the Taoists, the Buddhists, and the ancient Greeks, moving forward to the middle ages and the early modern period, then up to the existentialists and present day philosophy. The result is a diverting tour through the history of human thought as seen from a novel and unusual perspective. (shrink)

Sorensen here offers a unified solution to a large family of philosophical puzzles and paradoxes through a study of "blindspots": consistent propositions that cannot be rationally accepted by certain individuals even though they might by true.

This essay is concerned with Indian Yogācāra philosophers’ treatment of the problem of other minds in the face of a threatened collapse into solipsism suggested by Vasubandhu’s epistemological argument for idealism. I discuss the attempts of Dharmakīrti and Ratnakīrti to address this issue, concluding that Dharmakīrti is best seen as addressing the epistemological problem of other minds and Ratnakīrti as addressing the conceptual problem of other minds.

This chapter examines the debate between advocates of classical logic and advocates of intuitionistic logic. It examines the semantic and epistemic issues on which this debate is usually conducted. After introducing the idea that logic is a model of correct reasoning, the chapter explores the viability of a logic intermediate between classical and intuitionistic.

Can God create a stone too heavy for him to lift? Can time have a beginning? Which came first, the chicken or the egg? Riddles, paradoxes, conundrums--for millennia the human mind has found such knotty logical problems both perplexing and irresistible. Now Roy Sorensen offers the first narrative history of paradoxes, a fascinating and eye-opening account that extends from the ancient Greeks, through the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment, and into the twentieth century. When Augustine asked what God was doing before (...) He made the world, he was told: "Preparing hell for people who ask questions like that." A Brief History of the Paradox takes a close look at "questions like that" and the philosophers who have asked them, beginning with the folk riddles that inspired Anaximander to erect the first metaphysical system and ending with such thinkers as Lewis Carroll, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and W.V. Quine. Organized chronologically, the book is divided into twenty-four chapters, each of which pairs a philosopher with a major paradox, allowing for extended consideration and putting a human face on the strategies that have been taken toward these puzzles. Readers get to follow the minds of Zeno, Socrates, Aquinas, Ockham, Pascal, Kant, Hegel, and many other major philosophers deep inside the tangles of paradox, looking for, and sometimes finding, a way out. Filled with illuminating anecdotes and vividly written, A Brief History of the Paradox will appeal to anyone who finds trying to answer unanswerable questions a paradoxically pleasant endeavor. (shrink)

This study sets out to examine the implications of Foucault's work for students and researchers in a wide selection of areas in the social and human sciences.

Sorensen presents a general theory of thought experiments: what they are, how they work, what are their virtues and vices. On Sorensen's view, philosophy differs from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, it is possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Lessons learned about scientific experimentation carry over to thought experiment, and vice versa. Sorensen also assesses the hazards and pseudo-hazards of thought experiments. Although he grants that (...) there are interesting ways in which the method leads us astray, he attacks most scepticism about thought experiments as arbitrary. They should be used, he says, as they generally are used--as part of a diversified portfolio of techniques. All of these devices are individually susceptible to abuse, fallacy, and error. Collectively, however, they provide a network of cross-checks that make for impressive reliability. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson’s Modal Logic as Metaphysics is a book-length defense of necessitism about objects—roughly put, the view that, necessarily, any object that exists, exists necessarily. In more formal terms, Williamson argues for the validity of necessitism for objects (NO: ◻︎∀x◻︎∃y(x=y)). NO entails both the (first-order) Barcan formula (BF: ◇∃xΦ → ∃x◇Φ, for any formula Φ) and the (first-order) converse Barcan formula (CBF: ∃x◇Φ → ◇∃xΦ, for any formula Φ). The purpose of this essay is not to assess Williamson’s arguments either (...) for necessitism (although discussion of these arguments will play a central role in the dialectic) or for necessitism’s two famous corollaries. Instead, the focus shall be a general principle governing abstract objects—the abstract of principle (or AOP) —instances of which seems to be at work in some of Williamson’s central arguments for necessitism. The AOP can be straightforwardly formulated and applied within the neo-logicist framework—in fact, arguably the principle is most naturally formulated in neo-logicist terms. -/- After closely examining, and carefully formalizing, the AOP, the remainder of the paper focuses on arguments for necessitism-like claims (the exact meaning of “necessitism-like” will become clearer as the essay progresses) based on the AOP. In particular, we shall focus on the instance of the AOP that applies to the abstract objects governed by the most well-known and most fully studied abstraction principle: Hume’s Principle (HP). It turns out that, although we cannot reconstruct a valid argument for necessitism based on this numerical instance of the AOP, we can obtain valid arguments for weaker, but equally interesting conclusions. In particular, we shall show that, although HP combined with the AOP (and some additional, related assumptions) allows the contents of the domains of possible worlds to vary, the size of those domains must remain constant. The paper concludes by developing and critiquing some related arguments for necessitism based on applying relevant instances of the AOP to abstraction principles governing sets (or extensions), and to a simple objectual abstraction principle. (shrink)

The majority of research investigating beliefs toward nonhuman animals has focused on vivisection or utilized populations with clear views on animal issues. Minimal research has been conducted on what personality factors influence a nonclinical or nonadjudicated population’s beliefs about the treatment of animals. The purpose of the present study was to examine the role of empathy and personality traits in attitudes about the treatment of animals in 241 undergraduate students. Results indicated that those with high levels of empathy held more (...) positive attitudes toward animals and more negative beliefs about animal cruelty than those with low levels of empathy. Some differences in participants’ specific attitudes toward animals were found. Limitations and implications for future research are reviewed. (shrink)

At the turn of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Schlegel developed an influential theory of irony that anticipated some of the central concerns of postmodernity. His most vocal contemporary critic, the philosopher Hegel, sought to demonstrate that Schlegel’s theory of irony tacitly relied on certain problematic aspects of Fichte’s philosophy. While Schlegel’s theory of irony has generated seemingly endless commentary in recent critical discourse, Hegel’s critique of Schlegelian irony has gone neglected. This essay’s primary aim is to defend Hegel’s critique of (...) Schlegel by isolating irony’s underlying Fichtean epistemology. Drawing on Søren Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony in the final section of this essay, I argue that Hegel’s critique of irony can motivate a dialectical hermeneutics that offers a powerful alternative both to Paul de Man’s poststructuralist hermeneutics and to recent cultural-studies-oriented criticism that tends to reduce literary texts to sociohistorical epiphenomena. (shrink)

This volume is a collation of original contributions from the key actors of a new trend in the contemporary theory of knowledge and belief, that we call “dynamic epistemology”. It brings the works of these researchers under a single umbrella by highlighting the coherence of their current themes, and by establishing connections between topics that, up until now, have been investigated independently. It also illustrates how the new analytical toolbox unveils questions about the theory of knowledge, belief, preference, action, and (...) rationality, in a number of central axes in dynamic epistemology: temporal, social, probabilistic and even deontic dynamics. (shrink)

Questions about the meaning of life have traditionally been regarded as being of particular concern to philosophers. It is sometimes complained that contemporary analytic philosophy fails to address such questions, but there do exist illuminating recent discussions of these questions by analytic philosophers.1Perhaps what lurks behind the complaint is a feeling that these discussions are insufficiently close to actual living situations and hence often seem rather thin and bland compared with the vivid portrayals of such situations in autobiography or fiction. (...) I therefore want to focus on two works by Tolstoy—one autobiographical, one fictional—and try to see what philosophical lessons can be learned from them, particularly with regard to questions about the relation of death to the meaning of life. (shrink)

Epistemic Logic: 5 Questions is a collection of short interviews based on 5 questions presented to some of the most influential and prominent scholars in the field. We hear their views on the field, the aim, the scopes, the future direction of research and how their work fits in these respects.

In this book, Sorensen presents the first general theory of the thought experiment. He analyses a wide variety of thought experiments, ranging from aesthetics to zoology, and explores what thought experiments are, how they work, and what their positive and negative aspects are. Sorensen also sets his theory within an evolutionary framework and integrates recent advances in experimental psychology and the history of science.

This book explores the research of Professor Hilary Putnam, a Harvard professor as well as a leading philosopher, mathematician and computer scientist. It features the work of distinguished scholars in the field as well as a selection of young academics who have studied topics closely connected to Putnam’s work. It includes 12 papers that analyze, develop, and constructively criticize this notable professor's research in mathematical logic, the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of mathematics. In addition, it features a short (...) essay presenting reminiscences and anecdotes about Putnam from his friends and colleagues, and also includes an extensive bibliography of his work in mathematics and logic. The book offers readers a comprehensive review of outstanding contributions in logic and mathematics as well as an engaging dialogue between prominent scholars and researchers. It provides those interested in mathematical logic, the philosophy of logic, and the philosophy of mathematics unique insights into the work of Hilary Putnam. (shrink)

In Taking Frege at his Word, Joan Weiner proposes a wide-ranging re-thinking of Frege’s philosophical and mathematical projects. She begins by outlining what sh.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:WAiINWRIGHT, MARI'.rAIN, AND AQUINAS ON TRANSCENDENT EXPERIENCES1 Lours RoY, O.:P. Boston College Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts WHAT COULD ALLOW thoo1ogiianis to s1ay that rbrtanJScendent expmiences we, exiplicitly or implicitly, expenienoos of God? To ooswieir tMs question fully, one would ihavie Ibo ooga;ge in :two d:iisltmot mqumi1es. Fiirsit, religious, moml, iand psyoho101 giical icristeci:a 1are required in the evtalurution of concrete oases. They ctan he found in rthe grerut spi:ritUJal wriitings (...) of humankind. Secood, one mustt have reOOUTISe to ep;iisttemo1ogiica:l :and thieo1ogiaa1 foru.ndmbions if one wianits 1to 1an.swer tb.ie questtion in. its generality. ln,thJi:s a:riticle, I shall not preserut 1tihe religious, moral, 1and psychofogica1 criteria, because I sihou1d Jrike to OOiilCelllb:iaJte on mrueillecrtUJal prohliems invohiimg tihe sooond kmd of ·consideration. I shiaill use ais 1a ISl'bar:bing-pomt 1a book on mys:ticism written by Wiilliiam J. W1ainwcight. Turr tihe purposes of ttihis ess:ay, "trlanJScenidelllt experiences" wiilil. mean whmt W1affin:WI"ight calls " mystical experienoos " or " uniJtM"Y srbrubeis." 2 The phvase wi:ll. ailso inclUJde Otito'1s " nu:minoUJs etpeirieinces," Mrusforw's " peak expeme:nces" and, vecy hrorudJy, wll experiences that do not :focus on 1a, specific tidea :but afiectively open up to the mySltery wll:uich enoompas1ses hruman li£e. 1 I am grateful to the members of the Boston Theological Society for their questions and comments on the initial version of this essay. 2See his definition, in Mysticism: A. Study of Its Nature, Cognitive Value and Moral Implications (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), IS. The rest of his first chapter offers a good discussion of problems of typology as well as of the distinction between descriptions and interpretations of mystical experiences. Unfortunately I cannot take account of this interesting discussion in the limits of this paper. 655 656 LOUIS ROY, O.P. In conrtending thrut my:stical experieTIJces ihav;e nnetic v:al,idity if they are ra speciiaI kind of perception, W ainw~igrhit tries to 'Settle an 1:epis1temo10-gicra1l is1sue; ill downplaying "doctrina1l con-.sideration:s" and iJn rejeobing ",a thieo1ogical op~nion whioh cannoit he esbaiblished ihy philosoplhi1oal rea1s10n," 3 he suggesit,s 1bhat his oolJJ!teTIJtiion can 1and should he 1supp01rted only by philosophioal a11gumelJJ!t1s. In thi'S esisay, I intend 1to ques1truon thi:s two.fo1d 1tlhesis of Wwinwrrtiight'1s 1and to explore an albernartive. Wa:inwright, whose manner of dea1ing wirbh iinitellectuaJ proh1ems 1acoo,rds with \the p11esent-day main lme in Ang1o-American philosophy of re1i§ion,4 non:ebheless pays metiiculou:s a.trbention Ito neoscho1a1s1tic theori!es of mys1tiioism in Chapter 4 of his hook. Such 1an a;t1t:empt 1at serious diJalogue is of specia,l :intel'es1t since :i:t illu:stria1tes the diffioulty of finding a mee1ting ground for three qUJite different scho1w1·Jy wo,rlds: the p0:s1t-rpie1t~st one, wihich I regard a,s W,ruinwr.ighit'·s, modern sohoilais1t1icrsm, and Thomas Aquinas. A1though W1a1inwr1igh1t does not refer 1 to the lat:ter's views on the.topic, these views nev:erthe1e:s,s de:serve examination bo1th 1a1s the sou11oe of neoscho:iJa,stic 1theorie1s and 1as conti :ia:sting in 1s1 evera1 111espects wiith,them. The first pa~t of my paper will sketch three of the intellec1tuaJ contexits in which triam:soendefll!t experi!enoes may be discussed. The second part will highlight some features of Aquinrus's episitmnology and theo1ogy of gmce which whll enable us fo dertel'ITl!iDJe 1 at whait levels of cogn:iition experienceis of 1t11amiscendence should be s]tua1ted 1 and in what 1s1ense they may rbe s1aid to he experielll!ceis of God. 'Iihe third rpart wm presie111t how Thomais envisages the role of love :in 1the affective knowledge tha1t rbe1ieviers i;eceiive of God. F1inailly, the fomlth pamt will indicrabe the modial~ty of such lmowledge, namely, the dimect a1iva:renerss of orur aets and fee1ings of 1ove. a Wainwright, 162-163 and 180. 4 Exemplified by such authors as John Hick, Stephen Katz, Ninian Smart, Walter T. Stace, R. C. Zaehner. TRANSCENDENT EXPERIENCES 657 I. Three lnterprretative Contexts Since Schleiermadher, moist German... (shrink)

Our present actions can have effects on future generations - affecting not only the environment they will inherit, but even perhaps their very existence. This raises a number of important moral issues, many of which have only recently received serious philosophical attention. I begin by discussing some contemporary Western philosophical perspectives on the problem of our obligations to future generations, and then go on to consider how these approaches might relate to the classical Indian philosophical tradition. Although the Indian commitment (...) to pre-existence and rebirth precludes the arising of the Non-Identity Problem, this does not mean that there is not still a problem about justifying our obligations to future generations. The Indian Non-Reductionists about personal identity have difficulties with this that are comparable to the difficulties of their Western counterparts, but the Indian Buddhist Reductionists offer some provocative arguments for impartiality and the rationality of altruism. (shrink)

In "arguments for the existence of god" and "faith and knowledge", john hick argues for the rationality of religious belief on the basis of an analogy between religious and perceptual belief. i reply that the analogy does not obtain because there is no alternative solipsistic interpretation of perceptual belief possible. this is because (a) hick's phenomenology of dreaming is unsatisfactory and (b) wittgenstein's "private language" argument shows solipsism to be an unintelligible option.

An interesting feature of the language of many Daoist texts is their atypical idealization of Darkness and Obscurity, which contrasts with the positive connotations of Light and Clarity in virtually all great philosophical traditions. This article highlights a formerly unnoted difference between the received and the excavated Guodian 郭店 versions of the Laozi 老子, which reveals an interesting change in the use of Light/Darkness symbolism through the evolution of the text: while the received Laozi uses both metaphorical schemes to roughly (...) the same extent, the presumably earlier Guodian Laozi lacks almost all of the “bright” references that appear in later recensions, thus constituting a much “darker” version of the text. The article discusses the philosophical meaning of this terminological shift and the possible reasons for its occurrence, and closely analyzes three cases in which this process of “textual illumination” seems to have taken place during the transition between the Guodian and received version of the text. Alongside more specific implications such as the formerly unknown linkage between ming 明 and chang 常, a suggested stratification of chapter 55, and the possible relationship between the proto-Laozian materials and the Zhuangzi 莊子, this article also proposes a more general hypothesis according to which the absence of light metaphors in the Guodian version represents the jargon of an earlier “dark” stratum of Daoism, traces of which were preserved in some of the texts known to us today. (shrink)

We expand on the fixed point semantic approach of Kripke via the addition of two unary intensional operators: a paradoxicality operator Π where Π(Φ) is true at a fixed point if and only if Φ is paradoxical (i.e., if and only if Φ receives the third, non-classical value on all fixed points that extend the current fixed point), and an unbounded truth operator Υ⊤ where Υ⊤(Φ) is true at a fixed point if and only if any fixed point extending the (...) current fixed point can be extended to one on which Φ receives the value true. We prove a generalized version of Kripke’s fixed point theorem guaranteeing the existence of models of this new language, as well as an expressive completeness result. We conclude with an exploration of the significant improvements in expressive power that result from the addition of these new operators, and we precisely identify what still cannot be said on this intensional extension of the Kripkean framework. (shrink)

Failing Grades expands the look at the causes of violence and failure in America's schools. By focusing on interpersonal relations among diverse groups of students, the book demonstrates how conflict and low academic achievement are the result of clashes over communication, fairness, class, and race. This second edition contains new case studies derived from the author's experiences with students, teachers, and administrators; has a discussion of graduation rates, the achievement gap, and inadequacies of contemporary education; and contains an appendix that (...) outlines how teachers can implement dialogues and other multicultural activities in their classes. (shrink)

À l’opposé de ce qui est dit habituellement, le « et pourtant elle tourne » Galiléen, énoncé qui résume à la fois l’affirmation que c’est la terre qui tourne autour du soleil et le fait que Galilée a dû le renier, condamné par l’église, eh bien cet énoncé possède le grand défaut d’être seulement révolutionnaire. Révolutionnaire il y est deux fois. Il concerne la révolution de la terre autour du soleil et il désigne le renversement de pouvoir qu’est l’occupation du (...) centre du système terre-sole... (shrink)

As hopes that generative linguistics might solve philosophical problems about the mind give way to disillusionment, old problems concerning the relationship between linguistics and philosophy survive unresolved. This collection surveys the historical engagement between the two, and opens up avenues for further reflection. In Part 1 two contrasting views are presented of the interface nowadays called 'philosophy of linguistics '. Part 2 gives a detailed historical survey of the engagement of analytic philosophy with linguistic problems during the present century, and (...) sees the imposition by philosophers of an 'exploratory' model of thinking as a major challenge to the discipline of linguistics. Part 3 poses the problem of whether linguistics is dedicated to describing independently existing linguistic structures or to imposing its own structures on linguistic phenomena. In Part 4 Harris points out some similarities in the way an eminent linguist and an eminent philosopher invoke the analogy between languages and games; while Taylor analyses the rationale of our metalinguistic claims and their relationship to linguistic theorizing. Providing a wide range of views and ideas this book will be of interest to all those interested and involved in the interface of philosophy and linguistics. (shrink)

In the spring of 1987, I was in Havana, Cuba, where I was participating in planning a large-scale longitudinal study of the neurophysiological, neurochemical, and behavioral characteristics of cohorts of patients with cerebrovascular disease, depression, senile dementia, schizophrenia, or learning disabilities; and also part of this study were their first-degree blood relatives. This study was the outgrowth of a long-term project on the practical application of computer methods for the evaluation of brain electrical activity related to anatomical integrity, maturational development, (...) and sensory, perceptual;·-and cognitive processes, especially in chil dren. For many years, that project had been supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the National Scientific Research Center of Cuba (CNIC), and the Ministries of Public Health and of Education of Cuba. Since its inception, I had served as a technical advisor to the UNDP project. When the project began, I became acquainted with Dr. Jose M. Miyar Barrueco, who was at that time the Rector of the Medical School of the University of Havana. Because of his keen interest in the new computer technology and its potential utility in developing countries, we met from time to time during my visits. These occasional meetings continued after he became Secretary of the Cuban Council of State, so that he could remain apprised of progress and problems with which he might help. (shrink)

The Myth of Post-Racial America provides a history of race and racism in the United States.

A Cabinet of Philosophical Curiosities is a collection of puzzles, paradoxes, riddles, and miscellaneous logic problems. Depending on taste, one can partake of a puzzle, a poem, a proof, or a pun.

The aim of this paper is to show how thought experiments help us learn about laws. After providing examples of this kind of nomic illumination in the first section, I canvass explanations of our modal knowledge and opt for an evolutionary account. The basic application is that the laws of nature have led us to develop rough and ready intuitions of physical possibility which are then exploited by thought experimenters to reveal some of the very laws responsible for those intuitions. (...) The good news is that natural selection ensures a degree of reliability for the intuitions. The bad news is that the evolutionary account seems to limit the range of reliable thought experiment to highly practical and concrete contexts. In the fifth section, I provide reasons for thinking that we are not as slavishly limited as a pessimistic construal of natural selection suggests. Nevertheless, I promote the idea that biology is a promising source of predictions and diagnoses of thought experiment failures. (shrink)

What makes us human? Why do people think, feel and act as they do? What is the essence of human nature? What is the basic relationship between the individual and society? These questions have fascinated both great thinkers and ordinary humans for centuries. Now, at last, there is a solid basis for answering them, in the form of accumulated efforts and studies by thousands of psychology researchers. We no longer have to rely on navel-gazing and speculation to understand why people (...) are the way they are - we can instead turn to solid, objective findings. This book, by an eminent social psychologist at the peak of his career, not only summarizes what we know about people - it also offers a coherent, easy-to-understand, though radical, explanation. Turning conventional wisdom on its head, the author argues that culture shaped human evolution. Contrary to theories that depict the individual's relation to society as one of victimization, endless malleability, or just a square peg in a round hole, he proposes that the individual human being is designed by nature to be part of society. Moreover, he argues that we need to briefly set aside the endless study of cultural differences to look at what most cultures have in common - because that holds the key to human nature. Culture is in our genes, although cultural differences may not be. This core theme is further developed by a powerful tour through the main dimension of human psychology. What do people want? How do people think? How do emotions operate? How do people behave? And how do they interact with each other? The answers are often surprising, and along the way the author explains how human desire, thought, feeling, and action are connected. (shrink)

Nous sommes à l'âge de la membrane, telle est une des thèses politiques que défend et explicite ce livre, ce concept se réclamant à la fois du biopouvoir de Foucault et des analyses de la membrane qui caractérise le vivant selon Simondon. Cette membrane est entrée, après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, dans une nouvelle époque, celle du " vivantisme " (où toutes les formes de vie se valent), du néolibéralisme et des réseaux financiers. Est-ce à dire que toute politique n'est (...) plus que branchée sur la membrane, productrice de celle-ci ou résistance à ses déchirements? Mais ce serait oublier que la politique dépend de gestes, autre thèse de ce livre. Même la membrane a son geste. L'auteur définit l'émancipation par l'effectuation de véritables enchaînements de gestes en résonance avec d'autres (champ, chair, espace gestuel). Or, puisque la membrane n'est pas émancipatrice, tout geste-événement ouvrant un champ est un trou dans la membrane. I l n'est donc pas question de résister mais de trouer la membrane. (shrink)